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Vietnam and Iraq
By Mike Nicholas ‘07

The entire body o f human history is replete with similar events which echo each
other through each generation. Yet in the present day no such parallel has been given
more attention, scrutiny and examination than that which is purported to exist between
the current war in Iraq and the Vietnam Conflict. Advocates arguing that such a
commonality exists between the two are quick to display various points of similarity,
complete with the familiar language of words and phrases such as quagmire, stalemate,
and exit strategy. Their advocacy is not entirely without merit, for there are striking
similarities between Iraq and Vietnam. Yet to label the two wars as parallel suggests
only a cursory understanding of the complexly interwoven web of issues that was
Vietnam and that has been Iraq. Despite some similarity, they are fundamentally and
practically different conflicts, and as such are inherently dissimilar.
At the heart o f the difference between the Iraq War and the Vietnam Conflict is
the type o f war being waged. Vietnam was, at its core, a war for national independence,
a people’s war characterized by a class based insurgency whose goal was to unite the
country against a perceived privileged elite and their occupying allies.1 This was evident
immediately after World War I when Ho Chi Minh traveled to Paris to press for
recognition of Vietnamese independence and a national, unified government. France
refused to assent, maintaining its colonial control over the southern portion of Vietnam
and continuing to tighten its grip over the whole of the country. Further, the Vietnamese
had a long history o f resisting invading forces dating back to the Qin Dynasty in China.
At the time of major American involvement in the conflict, Ho Chi Minh was able to
characterize the war not as a defense of communism or a defeat of the United States per
se, but rather as a war for Vietnamese independence and the dislodging of imperial
invaders and their allies. In this sense, the Vietnam War was being fought long before
major U.S. involvement in the 1960s, since Ho Chi Minh was able to begin the armed
struggle for independence immediately following World War II. Nationalism united
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Minh and his followers, as the desire for independence fueled their continued enthusiasm
for action.
Iraq, in contrast, has devolved not into a people’s war for independence, but a
communal war with competing factions advancing different ideologies and agendas. The
goal o f each of these separate factions has been that o f survival over the other, more so
than national unity against an outside aggressor. The insurgents in Iraq have offered
essentially two competing ideologies, one being a state of permanent jihad (as advocated
by Al-Quida), and the other being that the minority Sunni Arabs deserve and are entitled
to rule over the majority Shiites and Kurds.2 This is best illustrated by the vast majority
of insurgent violence (85%) in Iraq, which has been caused by indigenous Sunnis, and
further most insurgent actions have occurred in the four Sunni dominated provinces,
despite the fact that only 40% o f the population live in this area.3 In Vietnam the clear
and stated goal o f Ho Chi Minh and the insurgency was national unification, as such
outside occupation was considered ample cause for war. Yet in Iraq those provinces
dominated by Shiite and Kurdish majorities have experienced negligible incidents of
violence as a result o f U.S. occupation.4
The nature o f the insurgency against the United States in Iraq versus that faced in
Vietnam extends further than the motivation o f the enemy. The actual composition,
tactics and execution o f the war in Iraq has been markedly different than that o f Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese were known for their skill in fighting a guerilla war, avoiding
direct confrontation with the United States in favor o f evasive, precision strikes designed
to hurt U.S. forces without suffering major losses. These guerilla tactics manifested
themselves in the form o f ambushes, raids, and various other “small” operations. Despite
claims o f similarity, such guerilla tactics have been rare in Iraq since 2004. Insurgents
have recently operated in small groups o f three or four, and have targeted not the bulk of
U.S. troops but civilian population centers, Iraqi police forces and Iraqi troops.5
The very notion of guerilla warfare presupposes the use o f military or paramilitary
troops to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy using unconventional means. The enemy
in Iraq, unlike the enemy in Vietnam, has proven incapable o f accomplishing this task.
This is evidenced by the rate of U.S. troop loss as a result of suicide bomb attacks and
other confrontations. Instead of losing entire platoons, the U.S. has suffered casualties in
groups o f eight or nine at a time. Indeed it is considered a “significant loss” should more
than a dozen troops die in combat, however in Vietnam the enemy inflicted that many
number of casualties in a matter of minutes during any engagement.6
Underscoring the organization o f the enemy are the political institutions of both
countries. Where Vietnam contained a highly organized and established communist
government in the north and a quasi-democratic society in the South, Iraq was under
dictatorial rule until the end of major combat operations in 2003 when Saddam Hussein
was removed by U.S. ground forces. Unlike Vietnam, the entire political structure o f the
country was placed directly under the U.S.-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority.
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The United States, despite exercising influence over the government o f Diem, was never
able to wield the entire political structure of Vietnam, and thus was never able to
implement its goals for the country as efficiently or with as much control over the
distribution o f resources as has been available in Iraq. This control allowed the U.S. to
transfer sovereignty to Iraq and allow democratic elections to occur in 2005, elections
which most Iraqis (particular Shi’a and Kurds) felt were legitimate.7 This is in stark
contrast to the U.S. efforts to promote democratic reforms in Vietnam; America was
never quite able to provide for a democratic government supported by a majority of the
South Vietnamese.
The final relevant point of difference between the types o f enemy faced during
each of the two conflicts is the international support surrounding each opponent. The
United States perceived Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese to have the support of
China and the Soviet Union, and this perception formed the basis of the domino theory
that would be used to justify American entry into Vietnam. Further, this support strongly
influenced U.S. policy in terms of conducting the war, both in strategic decisions as well
as international negotiations. Thus the enemy in Vietnam was not only the North
Vietnamese; it was also the Soviet Union as America’s competing superpower and China
as the dominant communist Asian power in direct proximity to Vietnam.8
Iraq has lacked this dynamic. The United States stands as the world’s sole
superpower, has been engaged in a coalition action (albeit with the U.S. playing the
vastly dominant role), and has faced an enemy that is almost entirely Iraqi (the notable
exceptions being some Saudis and Iranians). America has not had to fear the same Cold
War consequences when dealing with Iraqi insurgents as it had to consider when dealing
with the North Vietnamese. As a result, despite some similarities in the war’s conduct,
the nature of not only the enemy but of the historical context is considerably different.
Without the Cold War as a backdrop, the United States had considerably different goals
set for the outcome o f the Iraq War than when it sought a satisfactory resolution to the
Vietnam conflict.9
What the goals of the United States exactly are in entering the Iraq War has
remained in dispute between the Bush administration and its various detractors. What is
not in dispute at the present time however is the goal of the military forces currently
stationed in Iraq: to create an environment stable enough to allow Iraqis to build a
working government as well as civilian and military infrastructure sufficient for selfrule.10 Superficially this can be viewed as a similar situation to Vietnam, where the
United States’ purported goal was to provide the same security so that South Vietnam
could establish the same necessary infrastructure. Yet Vietnam played out differently
than Iraq has so far in that as it became painfully clear that the South Vietnamese would
not be able to successfully repel the North’s advances, or provide security for themselves,
General Westmoreland repeatedly requested additional troops. This escalation was
allowed due to the Cold War mindset that convinced the Johnson administration into
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believing that the fall of South Vietnam would mean the fall of the Asian continent to the
specter o f communism.11
No such specter exists in the current situation in Iraq. While it remains to be seen
whether or not additional troop commitment is necessary or if the Iraqis will ever be fully
capable o f providing for their own security, the key difference between the two conflicts
is that there is no national or unified opponent to Iraqi self-governance. Rather, there are
factions advancing ideologies that at times conflict. Unlike Vietnam, there is no primary
aggressor force with enough strength to adequately challenge the United States, there are
only various pockets o f insurgency that inflict physical and psychological damage
through small and specific actions, not military engagements. This situation alone
represents a different dynamic in the execution of the Iraq conflict as opposed to that in
Vietnam. It is impossible to tell at this moment whether or not this different dynamic
will produce a different ending.
Running parallel to the comparison of the international context is the comparison
of the major differences in reason as to why each conflict was entered by the United
States. With Vietnam, the U.S. had sent military advisors to South Vietnam from the end
of World War II all the way to the early 60s, but failed to formally commit military forces
until an attack was made (presumably) against U.S. ships patrolling the Gulf o f Tonkin.
This action led to an eponymous resolution authorizing President Johnson to take all
necessary measures to protect U.S. interests in Vietnam. The Iraq War, by contrast, was
begun on the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that
such action was necessary in the war on terrorism.12 What is significant about each of
these justifications is not the validity (or lack thereof) but the doctrine behind each. The
Gulf o f Tonkin Resolution was purported to be a response to an attack, a “second strike”
as a result o f the first blow being delivered by the Vietnamese. The authorizing
resolution given to President Bush was known as pre-emptive warfare, entered into to
prevent future aggression, even though no such aggression had manifested as a result of
Iraq’s actions.13
In essence, this doctrinal difference is significant in terms of answering the
Vietnam-era question o f “why are we here?” While the answers sounds similar (to stop
communism / to stop terrorism) the basis for each answer is significantly different in that
an attack was believed to have been made against the United States while in Iraq the
United States made a preemptive strike.
Furthermore, the diversity of media outlets and coverage of the Iraq War has led
to greater debate and division in the opposition to the Iraq War than in the Vietnam War.
When Walter Cronkite declared the war lost after the Tet Offensive (despite the battle
having actually been won by the United States) the vast majority of both the media and
the psyche o f the nation went with him. In that era, the news was covered primarily by
the three major news outlets. In Iraq, cable news channels and a greater diversity of
opinion has led to a more diverse opinion about the war in Iraq.14 While there was near
unanimous opposition to the continued involvement of U.S. troops after 1970 in Vietnam,

11 Leibstone, Marvin. “Comparing America’s Vietnam and Iraq Episodes.” Military Technology. 2005.
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Iraq has yet to reach such critical mass, and the diversity in public opinion remains a key
difference between the two conflicts.
Despite the significant differences in the political, social and military landscape in
Iraq and Vietnam, the most striking and significant difference between the two conflicts
lies in the level o f U.S. troop commitment, and more importantly in U.S. casualties. As
of March 2006, the total troop commitment of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq
combined has reached approximately 150,000, which pales in comparison to the
approximately 530,000 U.S. service personnel that were in Vietnam at the height of U.S.
involvement. Even more striking is the number o f casualties incurred by the U.S. during
this three-plus year conflict. To date [April 2006], the U.S. has suffered roughly 2,200
casualties after three years, compared to over 46,000 deaths due to combat actions in
Vietnam over 10 years, not including over 10,000 additional deaths due to non-combat
causes.15
The significantly less amount of casualties in Iraq can be attributed to the
composition o f the U.S. service personnel. Here lies another key difference between Iraq
and Vietnam. In Vietnam, substantial portions of the armed services were comprised of
draftees, with some 50,000 per month being inducted and sent to Vietnam at the height of
the conflict. The forces occupying Iraq are constituted entirely by volunteers.16 This has
led to a better-trained and more professional fighting force capable o f adapting to the
demands of desert warfare more efficiently than their Vietnam counterparts.
Furthermore, President Bush made the decision to call up the reserves and send them to
Iraq, something that President Johnson refused to do in the case of Vietnam. The result
has maintained a constant flow of professional soldiers into the Iraq conflict, while
draftees comprised the majority o f new entrants into the Vietnam conflict.17
None of these illustrative differences serve to categorically deny that there are
some stark similarities between Iraq and Vietnam. Similar problems and difficulties have
been here presented, and it is true that the end goal of Iraq, like that o f Vietnam, is not
quite clear. Further, there is no evidence that the war in Iraq can be won quickly, easily,
or even “won” at all (dependant on definition). Yet despite these similarities, and despite
the same potential for quagmire and stalemate, it is in the reasons for entering the war,
the composition of the enemy and their tactics, the political landscape, the international
context, the media coverage and the casualty ratio that we find clear and distinct
differences between the two conflicts. Iraq may echo Vietnam, but it is its own problem,
its own war, and will ultimately contain its own solution. Despite some notion of parallel
between the two, Iraq and Vietnam are inherently dissimilar wars.

15 Sorley, Lewis. “NoMore Vietnams.” The American Enterprise. Mar. 2006. Vol. 17. Iss. 2.
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